Opportunistic and Deliberate Disinflation under Imperfect Credibility
比较了审慎通缩与机会主义通缩两种策略在降低通胀方面的效果和成本，利用美联储FRB/US模型分析不同预期假设下央行可信度对通缩成本的影响。
On strategy for disinflation prescribes a deliberate path towards low inflation. A contrasting opportunistic approach eschews deliberate action and instead waits for unforeseen shocks to reduce inflation. This paper compares the ability of these two approaches to achieve disinflation-and at what cost. We analyze these issues using the Federal Reserve's FRB/US model, which allows alternative assumptions to be made about expectations held by agents in the economy; hence, the credibility of the central bank can be considered in assessing the cost of deliberate and opportunistic disinflation.