Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and Its Role in Managerial Compensation
研究CEO养老金安排，发现高管薪酬在债务与股权激励间存在平衡，且随年龄增长偏向债务；养老金占薪酬约10%，高债务激励的CEO经营更保守，并影响离职与现金薪酬模式。
ABSTRACT Though widely used in executive compensation, inside debt has been almost entirely overlooked by prior work. We initiate this research by studying CEO pension arrangements in 237 large capitalization firms. Among our findings are that CEO compensation exhibits a balance between debt and equity incentives; the balance shifts systematically away from equity and toward debt as CEOs grow older; annual increases in pension entitlements represent about 10% of overall CEO compensation, and about 13% for CEOs aged 61–65; CEOs with high debt incentives manage their firms conservatively; and pension compensation influences patterns of CEO turnover and cash compensation.