Employee bargaining power, inter-firm competition, and equity-based compensation
构建模型说明非高管员工的股权薪酬与产品市场竞争的关系：当市场竞争激烈且员工议价能力低时，企业会向员工提供股权薪酬以降低工资、增强竞争力，但这会导致囚徒困境。
We develop a model to illustrate that equity-based compensation for non-executive employees and product market decisions are related. When the product market is competitive and employees have low bargaining power, the unique equilibrium is for each firm's owners to offer equity-based compensation to their employees. In this setting, equity-based compensation leads to a lower wage rate, which makes each firm more competitive with its rival. However, this unique equilibrium is a Prisoner's Dilemma for the firms' original owners. Our results are consistent with several empirical regularities and provide predictions on when firms will offer equity-based compensation to their employees.