Cheap Talk Coordination of Entry by Privately Informed Firms
分析并比较了在私有信息潜在进入者之间，序贯和同时廉价谈话（如进入预告）对协调进入博弈的影响，发现廉价谈话能实现每种情况下的有效结果，且序贯谈话能产生更多样化的有效结果。
I analyze and compare the effects of sequential and simultaneous cheap-talk communication (e.g., preannouncement of entry) among privately informed potential entrants who then play a normal-form entry game. The first main result is that cheap-talk communication is powerful enough to enable the potential entrants to coordinate on an efficient outcome for each and every contingency. The second is that sequential cheap talk is more dextrous in this task in the sense that it can generate a greater variety of efficient outcomes than simultaneous cheap talk. The precise extent to which it does so is also explained.