Occupational Choice and Dynamic Incentives
构建一个世代交叠的委托代理模型，研究一般均衡下的激励合同如何影响个体的职业选择（工人或企业家）及社会福利，发现信贷市场不完善产生的租金能激励年轻工人努力储蓄，从而提升福利，而减少信贷摩擦或再分配政策可能适得其反。
We study an overlapping generations version of the principal-agent problem, where incentive contracts are determined in general equilibrium. All individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Imperfections in the credit market give rise to rents in entrepreneurial activities involving capital. These rents motivate poor young agents to work hard and save to overcome the borrowing constraints. With a labour market that is subject to moral hazard, the increased effort raises social welfare. Policies that reduce credit market imperfections, or redistribute income, may reduce welfare by dampening this effect.