Savings Gluts and Financial Fragility
提出一个基于激励的理论，解释储蓄过剩如何通过压缩资产价差、放松中介借贷约束并推高杠杆，最终导致金融脆弱性，为全球金融危机前的现象提供连贯解释。
Abstract We propose an incentive-based theory of how a savings glut produces financial fragility. Originators must be incentivized to produce high-quality assets. Assets are distributed to informed intermediaries or uninformed investors. A savings glut reduces origination incentives by compressing spreads between the prices paid for high-quality assets by informed intermediaries and prices paid by uninformed investors for generic assets. The narrowing of spreads relaxes intermediaries’ borrowing constraints, resulting in higher leverage. This generates financial fragility: intermediaries are more likely to become insolvent if unforeseen losses arise. Our model offers a coherent narrative of the run-up to the Global Financial Crisis.