Bribes in a Supply Line
研究了为加快基本服务交付而收取贿赂的现象，分析了监督和引入竞争对遏制腐败的效果，发现增加供应商可降低贿赂率和等待时间，消费者总收益超过雇佣额外供应商的成本。
The paper models the practice of charging bribes for faster delivery of essential services. It then examines the possibility of curbing corruption by supervision and by introducing competition among delivery agents. It is argued that a supervisory solution eludes the problem because no hard evidence of the reduction of corruption can be established for this type of offence. It is then shown that using more than one supplier reduces the bribe rate and the waiting period for both bribe‐payers and others; and the aggregate gain of consumers exceeds the cost of hiring additional suppliers.