Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of a Bankruptcy Regime
在契约执行较弱的环境下，债权人通过使债务难以重组来提高还款概率，但债权人之间的竞争可能导致债务过度难以重组，而设计得当的破产制度可以缓解这种低效。
In an environment characterized by weak contractual enforcement, sovereign lenders can enhance the likelihood of repayment by making their claims more difficult to restructure ex post. We show, however, that competition for repayment between lenders may result in a sovereign debt that is excessively difficult to restructure in equilibrium. This inefficiency may be alleviated by a suitably designed bankruptcy regime that facilitates debt restructuring. (c) 2007 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.