Loggers versus Campers: Compensation for the Taking of Property Rights
研究了政府征收私人财产权时，不同补偿规则如何影响私人投资和政府征收决策，发现市场价值补偿在现代社会具有优势。
Governments often have the power to take property rights from private citizens but their responsibility to pay compensation is typically not well specified. In this article we examine how the compensation rule adopted by a country affects both private investment decisions and takings decisions. We build on a widely accepted argument that any lump sum compensation, including zero, is the socially optimal compensation scheme. The lump sum compensation result hinges critically on the assumptions that the government maximizes social welfare and that the level of private investment does not affect the alternative use of the property rights. We find that when either of these assumptions are relaxed, the optimal compensation scheme will generally depend upon market values. The model presented here provides strong support for market value compensation for the taking of property rights in modern societies. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.