Institutional Ownership Stability and Risk Taking: Evidence From the Life–Health Insurance Industry
研究了人寿健康保险公司风险承担与其机构所有权稳定性之间的关系，发现稳定的机构所有权与较低的总风险相关，支持了谨慎人法则假说，并探讨了不同投资者类型和规模的影响。
Abstract We investigate the relationship between risk taking of life–health (LH) insurers and stability of their institutional ownership within a simultaneous equation system model. Three main results are obtained. First, stable institutional ownership of is associated with lower total risk of LH insurers, supporting the prudent‐man law hypothesis. Second, when investors are sorted in terms of stringency of the prudent‐man restrictions, their negative effect on risk holds for all, except insurance companies, as owners of LH insurers. Third, large institutional owners do not raise the riskiness of the investee‐firms, as proposed by the large shareholder hypothesis. Regulatory implications are drawn.