Materiality Judgments and the Resolution of Detected Misstatements: The Role of Managers, Auditors, and Audit Committees
研究经理人和审计师的激励以及审计委员会特征如何影响对已发现错报的重要性判断，发现审计师声誉激励和审计费用会削弱经理人压力，财务专家型审计委员会更不允许放弃重要错报。
ABSTRACT This study investigates how manager and auditor incentives, along with audit committee characteristics, are associated with materiality judgments about detected misstatements. Using data on detected misstatements that occurred between 2003 and 2006, we find auditors' incentives to protect their reputations weaken the effect of managerial incentives associated with the pressure created by analyst following; auditors are less likely to allow managers to waive material misstatements as audit fees increase. Regarding audit committee characteristics, results reveal that audit committees with greater financial expertise are less likely to allow managers to waive material misstatements compared to audit committees with less expertise. Data Availability: Data used in the study are available from public sources.