Consumer Protection in an Online World: An Analysis of Occupational Licensing
利用大型家装服务平台交易数据，研究发现消费者更看重从业者评价而非许可状态，且更严格的许可要求导致竞争减少、价格上升，但未提升需求或满意度。
We study the demand and supply implications of occupational licensing using transaction-level data from a large online platform for home improvement services. We find that demand is more responsive to a professional’s reviews than to the professional’s platform-verified licensing status. We show some evidence that consumers view licenses and reviews as substitutes. We confirm the generality of our findings off the platform in an independent consumer survey. Combining state-level licensing regulation data with platform microdata, we find that more stringent requirements are associated with less competition, higher prices, and no increase in demand or consumer satisfaction.