Legal Enforcement and Corporate Behavior: An Analysis of Tax Aggressiveness after an Audit
研究发现，企业被审计后几年内税收激进程度逐渐上升，随后急剧下降，呈现U型模式，这源于企业的策略性反应和贝叶斯审计风险更新，挑战了法律执行减少违规的普遍预期。
Contrary to common expectations, legal enforcement may increase subsequent corporate misbehavior. Using Internal Revenue Service and financial statement data, we find that corporations gradually increase their tax aggressiveness for a few years following an audit and then reduce it sharply. We show that this U-shaped impact is consistent with strategic responses on the part of firms and with Bayesian updating of audit risk. This adverse effect on corporate behavior calls for a reexamination of both the theory and policy of legal enforcement.