Vertical Information Restraints: Pro- and Anticompetitive Impacts of Minimum-Advertised-Price Restrictions
研究了最低广告价格限制如何通过增加零售市场搜索摩擦来软化竞争，并比较其与转售价格维持在促进价格歧视、服务提供和合谋方面的差异，福利效应可正可负。
We consider vertical contracts in which the retail market may involve search frictions. Minimum-advertised-price (MAP) restrictions act as a restraint on customers’ information and can therefore increase search frictions in the retail sector. Such restraints thereby soften retail competition—an impact also generated by resale price maintenance (RPM). However, by accommodating (consumer or retailer) heterogeneity, MAP restrictions can allow for higher manufacturer profits than RPM. We show that these restrictions can do so through facilitating price discrimination among consumers, encouraging service provision, and facilitating manufacturer collusion. Thus, welfare effects may be positive or negative compared with RPM or with the absence of such restrictions.