Price Ceilings as Focal Points for Tacit Collusion: Evidence from Credit Cards
利用1980年代信用卡市场数据，检验非约束性价格上限是否成为企业默契合谋的焦点，发现早期各州上限促进了合谋，但市场全国化削弱了这种效应，揭示了价格监管的负面作用。
We test whether a nonbinding price ceiling may serve as a focal point for tacit collusion, using data from the credit card market during the 1980’s. Our empirical model can distinguish instances when firms match a binding ceiling from instances when firms tacitly collude at a nonbinding ceiling. The results suggest that tacit collusion at nonbinding state-level ceilings was prevalent during the early 1980’s, but that national integration of the market reduced the sustainability of tacit collusion by the end of the decade. The results highlight a perverse effect of price regulation.