AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF AUCTIONS VERSUS GRANDFATHERING TO ASSIGN POLLUTION PERMITS
通过实验室实验比较拍卖与祖父制两种初始分配污染许可证的方式，发现拍卖能减少高排放者在二级市场中的市场势力，提高消费者剩余并消除暴利。
We experimentally study auctions versus grandfathering in the initial assignment of pollution permits that can be traded in a secondary spot market. Low and high emitters compete for permits in the auction, whereas permits are assigned for free under grandfathering. In theory, trading in the spot market should erase inefficiencies due to initial mis-allocations. In the experiment, high emitters exercise market power in the spot market, and permit holdings under grandfathering remain skewed towards high emitters. Furthermore, the opportunity costs of "free" permits are fully "passed through." In the auction, the majority of permits are won by low emitters, reducing the need for spot-market trading. Auctions generate higher consumer surplus and slightly lower product prices in the laboratory markets. Moreover, auctions eliminate the large "windfall profits" that are observed in the treatment with free, grandfathered permit allocations.