Competition among Exchanges
构建模型研究金融中介竞争是否导致标准过低，发现信用质量可观察时竞争要求适当担保，私人信息的影响取决于违约成本大小，竞争可能比垄断产生更高标准。
Does competition among financial intermediaries lead to excessively low standards? To examine this question, we construct a model where intermediaries design contracts to attract trading volume, taking into consideration that traders differ in credit quality and may default. When credit quality is observable, intermediaries demand the "right" amount of guarantees. A monopolist would demand fewer guarantees. Private information about credit quality has an ambiguous effect in a competitive environment. When the cost of default is large (small), private information leads to higher (lower) standards. We exhibit examples where private information is present and competition produces higher standards than monopoly does.