Demand–Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs
在Diamond和Dybvig模型基础上引入基本面决定均衡的机制，计算恐慌性银行挤兑的事前概率，并设计权衡流动性收益与挤兑成本的活期存款合约，判断银行能否提升整体福利。
ABSTRACT Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show that while demand–deposit contracts let banks provide liquidity, they expose them to panic‐based bank runs. However, their model does not provide tools to derive the probability of the bank‐run equilibrium, and thus cannot determine whether banks increase welfare overall. We study a modified model in which the fundamentals determine which equilibrium occurs. This lets us compute the ex ante probability of panic‐based bank runs and relate it to the contract. We find conditions under which banks increase welfare overall and construct a demand–deposit contract that trades off the benefits from liquidity against the costs of runs.