Large Shareholders, Private Benefits of Control, and Optimal Schemes of Privatization
当外国投资者可能竞购国企时，出价最高者未必是最佳大股东，因为其出价可能只反映控制权私利。政府需权衡收入与效率目标，最优方案常以出售股份数量为关键工具来吸引高效投资者。
We analyze optimal schemes for privatization of state enterprises when foreign investors are potential buyers. The highest bidders may not be the best large shareholders for the state enterprise, since their bid may reflect only their high private benefit of control. The government finds itself facing a tradeoff between trying to obtain the highest possible payment (the revenue objective) and identifying the company that will operate better in the future (the efficiency objective). Therefore, ordinary auctions are not appropriate. Our optimal privatization schemes in many cases require the use of the number of shares sold as a crucial instrument to attract the most efficient investors.