The Supply of Corporate Directors and Board Independence
研究发现本地董事人才池越大，董事会独立性越强，且独立性提升公司价值、经营业绩、CEO激励薪酬占比和更替率，解决了内生性问题。
Empirical evidence on the relations between board independence and board decisions and firm performance is generally confounded by serious endogeneity issues. We circumvent these endogeneity problems by demonstrating the strong impact of the local director labor market on board composition. Specifically, we show that proximity to larger pools of local director talent leads to more independent boards for all but the largest quartile of S&P 1500. Using local director pools as an instrument for board independence, we document that board independence has a positive effect on firm value, operating performance, fraction of CEO incentive-based pay, and CEO turnover. The Author 2013. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.