What Death Can Tell: Are Executives Paid for Their Contributions to Firm Value?
利用高管突然死亡时股价反应衡量其对股东价值的预期贡献，研究发现高管薪酬与贡献正相关，平均CEO保留65%的边际租金，且关系因个体、公司和行业特征而异。
Using stock price reactions to sudden deaths of top executives as a measure of expected contribution to shareholder value, we examine the relationship between executive pay and managerial contribution to shareholder value. We find, first, that the managerial labor market is characterized by positive sorting: managers with high perceived contributions to shareholder value obtain higher pay. The executive pay-contribution relationship is stronger for professional executives and for executives with high compensation. We estimate, second, that an average top executive (chief executive officer) appears to retain 71% (65%) of the marginal rent from the firm-manager relationship. We examine, third, how the executive pay-contribution relationship varies with individual, firm, and industry characteristics. Overall, our results are informative for the ongoing discussion about the level of executive compensation. This paper was accepted by Wei Jiang, finance.