Spillovers Inside Conglomerates: Incentives and Capital
研究发现企业集团内一个部门的行业盈余变化会溢出影响其他部门经理的薪酬，这种溢出在现金充裕、经理影响力大时增强，在治理强时减弱，且与绩效和公司价值下降相关。
Using hand-collected data on divisional managers at conglomerates, we find that a change in industry surplus in one division generates spillovers on managerial payoffs in other divisions of the same firm. These spillovers arise only within the boundaries of a conglomerate. The intra-firm spillovers increase when conglomerates have excess cash and when managers have more influence over its distribution, but decline in the presence of strong governance. These spillovers are associated with weaker performance and lower firm value. Our evidence is consistent with simultaneous cross-subsidization via managerial payoffs and capital budgets and suggests that these practices arise in similar firms.