Capital Requirements, Monetary Policy, and Aggregate Bank Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence
证明仅与信用风险挂钩的资本要求会增加均衡信用配给并降低总贷款，模型预测银行放贷决策会导致借款人股价异常上涨，且银行资本约束越强该反应越大，实证支持该预测，并解释了美联储近期通过增加货币供给刺激贷款失效的原因。
Capital requirements linked solely to credit risk are shown to increase equilibrium credit rationing and lower aggregate lending. The model predicts that the bank's decision to lend will cause an abnormal runup in the borrower's stock price and that this reaction will be greater the more capital-constrained the bank. I provide empirical support for this prediction. The model explains the recent inability of the Federal Reserve to stimulate bank lending by increasing the money supply. I show that increasing the money supply can either raise or lower lending when capital requirements are linked only to credit risk.