Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
分析纽约市高中匹配中因学校偏好存在无差异（平局）而引发的效率、稳定性和策略防护性之间的权衡，通过实地数据模拟和理论分析，推荐采用统一打破平局的学生提议延迟接受机制，并指出策略防护性带来的效率损失程度。
The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences—ties—in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school—single tiebreaking—in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tiebreaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions.