Intragroup Propping: Evidence from the Stock-Price Effects of Earnings Announcements by Korean Business Groups
研究韩国财阀集团内一家公司发布盈利公告时，对其他关联公司股价的影响，发现盈利上升（下降）会正向（负向）影响其他公司价值，且控制人现金流权越高、公司越大、业绩越好、债务担保比率越高，这种影响越强。
Using earnings announcement events made by firms belonging to Korean chaebols, we examine propping within a chaebol. Consistent with the market's ex ante valuation of intragroup propping, we find that the announcement of increased (decreased) earnings by a chaebol-affiliated firm has a positive (negative) effect on the market value of other nonannouncing affiliates. The sensitivity of the change in the market value of nonannouncing affiliates to abnormal returns for the announcing firms is higher if the cash flow right of the announcing firm's controlling shareholder is higher. The sensitivity is also higher if the announcing firm is larger, performs well, and has a higher debt guarantee ratio.