Vertical Foreclosure in Experimental Markets
通过实验检验纵向排他性理论，发现纵向一体化能帮助上游企业将产量限制在垄断水平，公共合同效果类似但无法完全替代；一体化还能从未整合的下游企业榨取更多剩余，这一议价效应在文献中被低估。
We report the results of experiments designed to test recent theories of vertical foreclosure. Consistent with the theory, vertical integration improves the upstream firm's ability to commit to restricting output to the monopoly level, as does the use of public contracts. Public contracts are not a perfect substitute for vertical integration, however: integration allows more surplus to be extracted from the unintegrated downstream firm, a bargaining effect that has been underemphasized in the recent foreclosure literature. Motivated by some observations that are difficult to reconcile with existing theory, we extend the theory to allow downstream firms to have heterogeneous (rather than purely passive or symmetric) out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Copyright 2001 by the RAND Corporation.