Special Interests and Technological Change
构建了一个代际交叠模型，研究过程创新与干中学两种技术进步来源的权衡，揭示年轻人和老年人因偏好创新或学习而产生的冲突，并通过动态共同代理问题分析政治均衡。
We model an OLG economy where productivity growth comes from two alternative sources: process innovation and learning-by-doing. There is a trade-off between the two in so far as frequent technological updates reduce the scope for learning on existing technologies. A conflict is shown to arise between the young and the old, because the former favor innovation while the latter prefer learning. We model the interaction between different generations and short-lived policy makers as a dynamic common agency problem, where competing generations invest a certain amount of resources to lobby either for the maintainance of the current technology or the adoption of a new one. By focusing on truthful Markov perfect equilibria, we characterize the political equilibrium and show its dependence on the underlying technological parameters.