Is the International Convergence of Capital Adequacy Regulation Desirable?
研究在各国央行关闭政策不同的情况下，国际银行资本要求趋同的利弊，发现缺乏监管宽容与资本要求的互补会导致宽容溢出，使银行竞争劣势恶化，并可能引发关闭政策向最差水平退化。
Abstract The merit of international convergence of bank capital requirements in the presence of divergent closure policies of different central banks is examined. The lack of a complementary variation between minimum bank capital requirements and regulatory forbearance leads to a spillover from more forbearing to less forbearing economies and reduces the competitive advantage of banks in less forbearing economies. Linking the central bank's forbearance to its alignment with domestic bank owners, it is shown that in equilibrium, a regression toward the worst closure policy may result: The central banks of initially less forbearing economies also adopt greater forbearance.