The Effect of Mandatory Extraction Payment Disclosures on Corporate Payment and Investment Policies Abroad
研究了强制性开采支付披露政策如何影响跨国公司在东道国的财政贡献和投资行为，发现披露企业增加支付但减少投资和获取开采许可，且这种效应在面临高声誉风险、腐败东道国或贿赂风险高的企业中更强。
ABSTRACT I examine how mandatory extraction payment disclosures (EPD)—a policy solution intended to discourage corporate payment avoidance in the oil, gas, and mining industries—affect fiscal revenue contributions and investments by multinational firms in foreign host countries. Using the staggered adoption of EPD across firms headquartered in Europe and Canada, I find that disclosing companies increase their payments to host governments, decrease investments, and obtain fewer extraction licenses relative to non‐disclosing competitors. These effects are stronger for firms that face a high risk of public shaming, operate in corrupt host countries, and have a high exposure to bribery‐prone payments, suggesting that EPD increases the reputational cost of corporate behavior that could be perceived as exploitative. The resulting reallocation of investments from disclosing to non‐disclosing firms reduces drilling productivity and resource production in host countries, consistent with uneven disclosure regulation distorting capital allocation.