Optimal Board Monitoring in Family‐owned Companies: Evidence from Asia
研究发现家族企业的最优董事会监督水平低于其他公司，过度监督反而损害小股东利益；对亚洲样本而言，最优状态是董事会独立38%、董事长与CEO分离、设立审计和薪酬委员会。
ABSTRACT Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: We propose that high levels of monitoring are not always in the best interests of minority shareholders. In family‐owned companies the optimal level of board monitoring required by minority shareholders is expected to be lower than that of other companies. This is because the relative benefits and costs of monitoring are different in family‐owned companies. Research Findings/Insights: At moderate levels of board monitoring, we find concave relationships between board monitoring variables and firm performance for family‐owned companies but not for other companies. The optimal level of board monitoring for our sample of Asian family‐owned companies equates to board independence of 38 per cent, separation of the chairman and CEO positions, and establishment of audit and remuneration committees. Additional testing shows that the optimal level of board monitoring is sensitive to the magnitude of the agency conflict between the family group and minority shareholders and the presence of substitute monitoring. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study shows that the effect of additional monitoring on agency costs and firm performance differs across firms with different ownership structures. Practitioner/Policy Implications: For policymakers, the results show that more monitoring is not always in the best interests of minority shareholders. Therefore, it may be inappropriate for regulators to advise all companies to follow the same set of corporate governance guidelines. However, our results also indicate that the board governance practices of family‐owned companies are still well below the identified optimal levels.