Is Silence Golden? Earnings Warnings and Subsequent Changes in Analyst Following
研究了管理层不发布盈利预警是否会因损害声誉而导致分析师关注度下降，发现不预警的公司相比预警的公司，分析师关注度显著降低。
Skinner (1994) proposes that managers have reputational incentives to preempt negative earnings news and speculates that firms that fail to warn are less likely to be followed by financial analysts. My study formally puts forward this argument and empirically tests the reputational cost of withholding bad news in the form of a decrease in analyst following. I find that among firms with a similar level of existing disclosure reputation, those that fail to warn experience a significant decrease in analyst following relative to those that warn. This finding is consistent with managers' concerns that withholding bad news would damage their reputation for being transparent about forward-looking earnings news.