Partner Uncertainty and the Dynamic Boundary of the Firm
研究了资产所有者可能事后更换伙伴时企业的动态边界，识别了非一体化下的“替代外部性”与一体化下的“保留外部性”之间的权衡，发现资产专用性越高，一体化越有吸引力。
We develop a new theory of the dynamic boundary of the firm where asset owners may want to change partners ex post. We identify a fundamental trade-off between (i) a “displacement externality” under non-integration, where a partner leaves a relationship even though his benefit is worth less than the loss to the displaced partner, and (ii) a “retention externality” under integration, where a partner inefficiently retains the other. With more asset specificity, displacement externalities matter more and retention externalities less, so that integration becomes more attractive. Wealth can resolve ex post inefficient partner arrangements, but may weaken ex ante incentives for specific investments.