Majority Rule and Utilitarian Welfare
研究了投票成本、价值和选民规模随机时，多数规则和超级多数规则的福利性质，发现多数规则在特定条件下能以概率1实现功利主义选择，而严格超级多数规则则不能。
We study the welfare properties of majority and supermajority rules when voting is costly and values, costs, and electorate sizes are all random. Unlike previous work, where the electorate size was either fixed or Poisson distributed, and exhibited no limiting dispersion, we allow for general distributions that permit substantial dispersion. We identify conditions on these distributions guaranteeing that a large election under majority rule produces the utilitarian choice with probability one. Absent these conditions, nonutilitarian outcomes are possible, as we demonstrate. We also show that majority rule is the only voting rule with the utilitarian property—strict supermajority rules are not utilitarian.