Crises and Capital Requirements in Banking
构建一般均衡模型，分析银行存在逆向选择和道德风险时，监管者如何通过许可审查、事后审计和资本要求来应对，并探讨信心危机与资本要求收紧的关系。
We analyze a general equilibrium model in which there is both adverse selection of, and moral hazard by, banks. The regulator can screen banks prior to giving them a licence, audit them ex post to learn the success probability of their projects, and impose capital adequacy requirements. Capital requirements combat moral hazard when the regulator has a strong screening reputation, and they otherwise substitute for screening ability. Crises of confidence can occur only in the latter case, and contrary to conventional wisdom, the appropriate policy response may be to tighten capital requirements to improve the quality of surviving banks.