Do Bankruptcy Codes Matter? A Study of Defaults in France, Germany, and the U.K.
通过研究法、德、英三国小企业银行债务违约案例，发现债权人权利差异促使银行调整贷款和重组方式以应对破产法成本，但回收率仍显著不同。
ABSTRACT Using a sample of small firms that defaulted on their bank debt in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, we find that large differences in creditors' rights across countries lead banks to adjust their lending and reorganization practices to mitigate costly aspects of bankruptcy law. In particular, French banks respond to a creditor‐unfriendly code by requiring more collateral than lenders elsewhere, and by relying on collateral forms that minimize the statutory dilution of their claims in bankruptcy. Despite such adjustments, bank recovery rates in default remain sharply different across the three countries, reflecting very different levels of creditor protection.