Tacit collusion under interest rate fluctuations
研究利率波动如何影响企业间的默契合谋，发现合谋不仅取决于贴现因子水平，还受其波动性影响：贴现因子水平越高，合谋价格和利润越高；波动性越大，合谋价格和利润越低。
Previous literature has shown that demand fluctuations affect the scope for tacit collusion. I study whether discount factor fluctuations can have similar effects. I find that collusion depends not only on the level of the discount factor but also, and more surprisingly, on its volatility. Collusive prices and profits increase with a higher discount factor level, but decrease with its volatility. These results have important implications for empirical studies of collusive pricing, the role that collusive pricing may play in economic cycles and the study of cooperation in repeated games.