Performance Appraisals and the Impact of Forced Distribution—An Experimental Investigation
通过真实努力实验，比较了无限制评分与强制分布评分对工人生产力的影响，发现强制分布使生产力提高6%至12%，但在有破坏选项时效果适得其反。
A real-effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in turn receive a bonus payment based on these ratings. We compare a baseline treatment in which supervisors are not restricted in their rating behavior to a forced distribution system in which they have to assign differentiated grades. We find that productivity is significantly higher under a forced distribution by about 6% to 12%. However, the productivity effects are less clear cut when participants have prior experience with the baseline condition. Moreover, a forced distribution becomes detrimental when workers have access to a simple option to sabotage each other. This paper was accepted by Peter Wakker, decision analysis.