On the Determinants and Importance of Punitive Damage Awards
研究了惩罚性赔偿的理论与实证问题，发现私人合同和声誉可替代惩罚性赔偿，且惩罚性赔偿金额波动大、难以预测，但诉讼本身会通过声誉成本降低公司价值。
We examine several theoretical and empirical issues concerning punitive damage awards and their importance to business. First, we argue that previous justifications of punitive damage awards ignore the role of private contracting and reputation in assuring contractual performance. In the absence of externalities, punitive awards are not necessary to assure contractual performance even when firms face less than a 100 percent probability of being sued for contractual breach. Next, we examine empirically the sizes, determinants, and valuation impacts of punitive awards assessed against publicly held companies. We find that settlement amounts are low compared to jury awards, and punitive awards are highly variable and difficult to explain using characteristics of the lawsuit or defendant company. Supreme Court and legislative actions affecting punitive awards generally have not had systematic impacts on firm values. Specific punitive lawsuits, however, decrease the values of defendant companies by amounts that exceed settlement or jury verdict amounts, indicating that punitive lawsuits impose reputational costs on defendants.