Optimal Regulation of Cooperative R&D Under Incomplete Information
研究监管者如何设计合作合同，激励两家企业共享技能并协调研发努力，发现努力为战略互补时双方努力均低于最优水平，为战略替代时则一方向下扭曲、另一方向上扭曲。
A regulator offers a cooperation contract to two firms to develop a research project. The contract provides incentives to encourage skill‐sharing and coordinate subsequent efforts. Innovators must get informational rents to disclose their privately known skills, which results in distorting R&D efforts with respect to the first‐best level. When efforts are strategic complements, both efforts are distorted downwards. By contrast, when efforts are strategic substitutes, the effort of the firm with most valuable skills is distorted downwards (to decrease rents) and the effort of the other firm is distorted upwards (to compensate the previous efficiency loss).