OPTIMAL RULES FOR PATENT RACES*
研究了专利竞赛中两个关键规则（最低创新要求和收益分配）的最优组合，发现当效率成本低、企业相似且追求社会剩余最大化时，竞赛才不可取；否则竞赛能激励创新并淘汰低效创新者。
There are two important rules to patent races: minimal accomplishment necessary to receive the patent and the allocation of the innovation benefits. We study the optimal combination of these rules. A planner, who cannot distinguish between competing firms in a multistage innovation race, chooses the patent rules by maximizing either consumer or social surplus. We show that efficiency cost of prizes is a key consideration. Races are undesirable only when efficiency costs are low, firms are similar, and social surplus is maximized. Otherwise, the optimal policy involves a race of nontrivial duration to spur innovation and filter out inferior innovators.