Why Are CEOs Rarely Fired? Evidence from Structural Estimation
通过估计一个动态模型，评估了CEO被迫离职率并量化了对股东价值的影响，发现董事会行为如同更换CEO需花费股东至少2亿美元，这主要源于CEO的固守而非实际成本，消除该成本可使股东价值提升3%。
ABSTRACT I evaluate the forced CEO turnover rate and quantify effects on shareholder value by estimating a dynamic model. The model features learning about CEO ability and costly turnover. To fit the observed forced turnover rate, the model needs the average board of directors to behave as if replacing the CEO costs shareholders at least $200 million. This cost mainly reflects CEO entrenchment rather than a real cost to shareholders. The model predicts that shareholder value would rise 3% if we eliminated this perceived turnover cost, all else equal. The model also helps explain the relation between CEO firings, tenure, and profitability.