Credible Commitment to Optimal Escape from a Liquidity Trap: The Role of the Balance Sheet of an Independent Central Bank
指出，央行盯住CPI通胀会削弱其承诺超调通胀以逃离流动性陷阱的能力，而独立央行对资本和资产负债表的关注恰好提供了可信承诺机制，最优政策可采取货币贬值加爬行盯住的方式。
Central banks target CPI inflation; independent central banks are concerned about their balance sheet and the level of their capital. The first fact makes it difficult for a central bank to implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, because it undermines a commitment to overshoot the inflation target. We show that the second fact provides a solution. Capital concerns provide a mechanism for an independent central bank to commit to inflate ex post. The optimal policy can take the form of a currency depreciation combined with a crawling peg, a policy advocated by Svensson as the “Foolproof Way” to escape from a liquidity trap.