Persuading the Principal to Wait
研究了有偏见的代理人如何通过策略性信息披露影响委托人行使实物期权的时机，发现承诺延迟披露所有信息是最优说服策略，但缺乏动态承诺时仅在小偏见下可信。
A principal decides when to exercise a real option. A biased agent influences this decision by strategically disclosing information. Committing to disclose all information with a delay is the optimal way to persuade the principal to wait. Without dynamic commitment, this promise is credible only if the agent’s bias is small; otherwise, he pipets information, probabilistically delaying the principal’s action. When the agent is biased toward early exercise, his lack of commitment to remain quiet leads to immediate disclosure, hurting him. Our model applies to pharmaceutical companies conducting clinical trials to influence the Food and Drug Administration or equipment manufacturers testing their products.