Perfect bidder collusion through bribe and request
研究了动态环境中两个投标人在第二价格拍卖中的合谋，提出一种包含贿赂提议和请求的合谋方案，并证明存在成功概率为1的稳健均衡。
We study collusion in a second-price auction with two bidders in a dynamic environment. One bidder can make a take-it-or-leave-it collusion proposal, which consists of both an offer and a request of bribes, to the opponent. We show that there always exists a robust equilibrium in which the collusion success probability is one. In the equilibrium, for each type of initiator the expected payoff is generally higher than the counterpart in any robust equilibria of the single-option model (Esö and Schummer (2004)) and any other separating equilibria in our model.