Labor Market Mobility and Expectation Management: Evidence from Enforceability of Noncompete Provisions
研究利用美国各州加强竞业禁止条款执行的准自然实验，发现劳动力流动性降低时，经理人更倾向于向下引导分析师预期，且这一手段比真实或应计盈余管理使用更多。
ABSTRACT This study examines how managers' use of expectation management is affected by their labor market mobility, which we measure by the enforceability of noncompete provisions in their employment contracts. Exploiting quasinatural experiments, our difference‐in‐differences analyses provide new causal insights to the growing literature on how managers' career concerns affect their disclosure choices. Consistent with a less mobile labor market imposing more pressure on managers to achieve earnings expectations, we predict and find that managers in US states that tightened enforcement of noncompete provisions are more likely to manage analyst expectations downward. We also find that downward expectation management is used to a greater extent than other tools such as real and accrual‐based earnings management. Additional analysis shows that the increase in expectation management is more pronounced for CEOs with lower general skills or shorter tenures, for firms with more independent boards, and for industries that are more homogeneous. Our path analysis suggests a significant link between increased use of expectation management after tightened noncompete enforcement and meeting and beating earnings expectations, which in turn is linked to lower executive turnover. Overall, our findings suggest that expectation management is an important channel through which noncompete enforcement reduces executive labor market mobility. Our study sheds light on the underlying mechanism through which labor market mobility affects disclosure choices and has important implications for both firms and regulators on the use and enforcement of noncompete provisions.