A lender-based theory of collateral☆
提出银行因无法承诺提供信贷而产生效率损失，抵押品能改善银行对边际盈利项目的融资收益，从而缓解这一无效率。模型预测高质量借款人抵押更少，与实证一致。
We offer a novel explanation for the use of collateral based on the dual function of banks to provide credit and assess the borrower’s credit risk. There is no moral hazard or adverse selection on the part of borrowers–the only inefficiency is that banks cannot contractually commit to providing credit as their credit assessment is subjective. Without collateral, a bank may deny credit even if its credit assessment suggests that the project is marginally profitable. Collateral improves the bank’s payoffs fromfinancing such marginally profitable projects, thus mitigating the inefficiency arising from discretionary credit decisions. Unlike models of borrower adverse selection, our model suggests that high-quality borrowers post less collateral than low-quality borrowers, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. We thank Patrick Bolton, Oliver Hart, Nobu Kiyotaki, and seminar participants at New York University,