Do Investors Benefit from Selective Access to Management?
研究了在仅限受邀的投资者会议上，投资者通过与管理层的一对一会谈和分组讨论获得选择性信息，发现这些信息能带来显著交易量增加和潜在交易收益，即使在公平披露法规之后仍存在。
ABSTRACT This paper examines whether selective access to corporate managers allows investors to revise their beliefs and execute profitable trades. We examine whether investors benefit from two potential opportunities for selective access at invitation-only investor conferences: one-on-one meetings with managers throughout the day and breakout sessions with managers after the webcast presentation. We find significant increases in trade sizes during the hours when firms provide offline access to investors, consistent with selective access providing investors with information they perceive to be valuable enough to trade upon. We also find significant potential trading gains concentrated primarily in three-day horizons after the conference for firms providing formal offline access, suggesting that selective access can lead to profitable trading opportunities. These trading gains are associated with analyst notes published during that period, indicating that such notes are one potential source of revelation to the broader market. Our evidence suggests that selective access to management conveys benefits to certain investors even in the post-Reg FD period. JEL Classifications: M41; K22.