Horizontal Reputation and Strategic Audience Management
研究决策者如何利用声誉同时影响多个有不同偏好的受众，发现声誉激励存在两种均衡，其中低效均衡可能导致福利低于无声誉情形，并探讨了战略受众管理（如集权、委托给持异议的第三方）如何缓解这种低效。
Abstract We study how a decision maker uses his reputation to simultaneously influence the actions of multiple receivers with heterogenous biases. The reputational payoff is single-peaked around a bliss reputation at which the incentives of the average receiver are perfectly aligned. We establish the existence of two equilibria characterized by repositioning toward this bliss reputation that only differ through a multiplier capturing the efficiency of reputational incentives. Repositioning is moderate in the more efficient equilibrium, but the less efficient equilibrium features overreactions, and welfare may then be lower than in the no-reputation case. We highlight how strategic audience management (e.g., centralization, delegation to third parties with dissenting objectives) alleviates inefficient reputational incentives, and how multiple organizational or institutional structures may arise in equilibrium as a result.