Manipulability in a group activity selection problem
研究了在群体活动选择问题中，基于个体对活动和参与人数的偏好，分配方案在最大个体理性、核心稳定性和帕累托最优性下的策略操纵可能性，分析了三种偏好扩展下的可操纵性。
We consider the aspect of strategic manipulation in a group activity selection problem. Given a set of activities in which they might participate, the agents have preferences over the activities themselves and over the number of participants in the activities; the goal is to assign agents to activities on basis of their preferences. In this paper, we consider the possibility of strategic manipulation involved in providing solutions in such a setting, for the solution concepts of maximum individual rationality, core stability, and Pareto optimality respectively. For three different preference extensions (Gärdenfors extension, maxi–min extension and maxi–max extension) we analyze strategic manipulability with respect to the number of activities available. In general, the considered solution concepts turn out to be prone to strategic manipulation; in some natural special cases, however, strategyproofness is provided by such an aggregation.