THAT’S NEWS TO ME! INFORMATION REVELATION IN PROFESSIONAL CERTIFICATION MARKETS
通过体育卡评级市场的实地实验，发现专业认证为新手提供新信息但为老手增加有限，新进入者采用更精确的评级标准，且市场能识别不同标准的价格差异。
Using sportscard grading as an example, we employ field experiments to investigate the informational role of professional certifiers. Empirical results suggest three patterns: first, the grading certification provided by the first professional certifier offers new information to inexperienced traders but adds little information to experienced dealers. This implies that the certification may reduce the information asymmetry between informed and uninformed parties. Second, compared with the incumbent, new entrants adopt more precise signals and use finer grading cutoffs to differentiate from the incumbent. Third, our measured differentiated grading cutoffs map consistently into prevailing market prices, suggesting that the market recognizes differences across multiple grading criteria.